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Abstract 
Bribery harms the global playing field as it distorts fair completion, undermines honest 
practices and increases transactional costs, which results in significant uncertainty in 
transnational business. The Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS)’ crackdown on the 
pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)’s bribery and corruption, signals a broad 
trend toward elevated scrutiny of all foreign corporations operating in China. The case of GSK 
serves as a timely wake-up call indicating that China’s anti-bribery law has shown its teeth 
against foreign multinational companies (MNCs). GSK’s bribery may also invoke 
anticorruption enforcement across multiple major jurisdictions including both the U.S. and 
UK, as well as, China. The more global approach of enforcement agencies should incentivise 
greatly MNCs to design and implement anti-bribery compliance programmes commensurate 
with their risk of corruption, with a particular regard to China’s unique business and legal 
culture. 
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1 Introduction 
Bribery damages the long-term interests of both host and home countries as well as business 
itself. Since China’s entry into the global anti-corruption enforcement arena, there has been a 
significant change in the enforcement landscape of its anti-bribery laws.1 China has enacted 
new laws aimed at targeting corporate bribery in the wake of a global crackdown on overseas 
corporate corruption.2 Due to the increased allegations of fraudulent behaviour and ethical 
misconduct on the part of multinational companies (MNCs), China has been targeting high-
profile foreign MNCs on multiple fronts with harsh enforcement against bribery.3 Such an 
approach forces MNCs to defend their reputation in China where international brands often 
have a valuable edge over local competitors in terms of public trust.4 
Part I introduces the contextual circumstances of China’s lucrative but corrupt business 
environment, which includes arbitrary enforcement as well as  a general campaign against bribery 
and corruption. The case of GSK serves as an epitome of the current anti-bribery campaign against  
foreign MNCs . Part II looks at China’s anti-bribery legal and regulatory framework, including the 
Anti–Unfair Competition Law (AUCL 1993) and the The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
Disciplinary System, with a particular regard to an Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) & 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC)-jointly issued Judiciary Interpretation 2012 based on the Criminal 
Law of China.5 Part III examines the remit of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 
clarifying some controversial issues like the scope of foreign officials, foreign issuers, affirmative 
defences and exceptions. It also partly explains whether GSK should be liable under the FCPA’s 
accounting and anti-bribery provisions. Part IV moves to the UK Bribery Act 2010, widely perceived 
as the most stringent Act in the anti-bribery arena. However, doubt is cast as to whether an 
adequate procedure could shield the firm covered from its strict liability under section 7 under UK 
Bribery Act 2010. Part V challenges GSK’s internal compliance procedures and argues that GSK 
may not rely on the “rogue employee defence” established in the case of Morgan Stanley, in which 
vigorous compliance programmes have averted the US enforcement actions against the firm. Before 
 
1 P.R. China ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCC) in January 2006; Elizabeth K. 
Spahn, ‘Multijurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’ (2012) 53 (1) 
Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 52: “Although China is not yet an OECD Convention member state, it 
enacted domestic laws criminalizing bribery of foreign officials abroad in 2011.” 
2 Bribery Act 2010; The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq 
3 Michael Martina, ‘GlaxoSmithKline Routed China Bribes through Travel Agencies–Police’ Reuters (15 July 
2013) 
4 Cong Dai and Min Jiang, ‘GSK Executives Admit to Bribery and Tax Crimes, China Claims’ British Medical 
Journal (18 July 2013) <http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f4541/rr/654217> 
5 On 26 December 2012, the SPC and SPP jointly promulgated the Interpretation of Several Issues Concerning 
the Application of Law for Handling Bribery Cases ( Interpretation 2012) which became effective on 1 January 1 
2013. The Judicial Interpretation includes significant provisions regarding entities who offer bribes as well as 
monetary thresholds for criminal prosecution. 
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turning to the general conclusion, Part VI explores how a foreign multinational could make its 
global compliance programmes compatible in China’s unique business environment. Among other 
things, it is indispensable for the MNCs to undertake risk-based due diligence on overseas third 
parties as well as their subsidiaries.  
2 Context 
2.1 A Most Lucrative Pharmaceutical Market  
As one of the most important markets for future growth, China is too lucrative a market to 
resist. Building personal relationships (guanxi), which is tantamount to bribery, is critical for 
successfully doing business in China, and thus engrained in Chinese business culture.6 Business 
courtesies constitute a grey area and the complexities of China's hospital and pharmaceutical 
network make it particularly thorny for foreign MNCs to navigate.7 In addition, China’s 
healthcare system is controlled and owned by the state, along with a rooted practice of 
government patronage and gift-giving.8 The pharmaceutical manufacturers are more likely to 
encounter corruption, as such an area is characterised by a high preponderance of state-owned 
customers.9 More contentiously, China prefers discretionary administrative policy to 
predictability, opacity to transparency and decentralised enforcement of the law, which provides 
incentives for rent-seeking behaviour.10 Previously, much foreign anti-bribery enforcement did 
not trigger an investigation  in China. With the Chinese agencies reshaping its enforcement 
landscape, a number of world’s largest pharmaceutical companies have been facing corruptions 
investigation over claims of bribery. 
China, being one of the fastest growing emerging markets is expected to overtake Japan as the 
world's second biggest pharamceutical market behind the United States by 2016.11 Sales of 
 
6 Benjamin Shobert and Damjan DeNoble, ‘Compliance after China’s Healthcare Bribery Scandals’ China Business 
Review (10 October 2013) 
7 Seung Ho Park and Wilfried R. Vanhonacker, ‘The Challenge for Multinational Corporations in China: Think 
Local, Act Global’ MIT Sloan Management Review (1 July 2007) 
8 ‘Glaxo Looks into Alleged Bribery of Chinese Doctors’ Shanghai Business Review (13 June 2013) 
9 R. Christopher Cook, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement Trends in 2010 and Beyond’ (January 
2010)  
<http://www.jonesday.com/The-Foreign-Corrupt-Practices-Act-Enforcement-Trends-in-2010-and-Beyond-01-12-
2010/> 
10 Nathan Bush, ‘Corruption & Fraud in China: Challenges for US Companies & Investors’ (29 August 2011)  
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/13597.htm> 
11 Kazunori Takada, ‘China to Launch Fresh Pharmaceutical Bribery Probe’ CNBC (14 August 2013) 
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pharmaceuticals in China reached $82 billion in 2012, up 18.2% from 2011.12 China’s health 
costs are expected to double and the demand for drugs will boom, which is projected to rocket 
from $357 billion in 2011 to $1 trillion in 2020.13 China is an increasingly important market 
for international pharmaceutical companies drug makers, such as GSK, which rely on growth in 
emerging markets to offset slower sales in Western markets with the loss of patent protection 
for key treatments.14 GSK earned $1.42 billion from China in 2012, and has five 
manufacturing plants in the country employing 5000 people. Although it generates only 3% of 
GSK’s global revenues, China represents one of the fastest-growing drug markets.15 Its revenue 
in China rose 17% in 2012 to nearly $1.2 billion, compared with growth rates of 11% in Latin 
America and 10% in India.16 However, it is important to be aware of the unique Chinese 
business environment where the giant pharmaceutical firm has generated this impressive 
growth.  
2.2 A Corrupt Business Environment? 
2.2.1 The Pervasive Corruption in the Chinese Market 
Bribery and corruption are rampant in China.17 Personal relationships are indispensible in 
China which is different from other jurisdictions, and the concept of business ethics is an 
oxymoron.18 Corruption is thought to be endemic in wide swaths of the Chinese health 
industry, and is perceived as a cost of doing business.19 The line is often blurred between what 
is appropriate and what is perceived as bribery.20 The acquiescence to China’s corrupt 
environment, however, can be a double-edged sword in that foreign MNCs’ agents may view 
 
12 Laurie Burkitt and Jeanne Whalen, ‘China Targets Big Pharma’ The Wall Street Journal (16 July 2013) 
13 ‘Big Pharma in a Little Trouble in China’ Economist (12 July 2013) 
14 Ian Walker, ‘GlaxoSmithKline Profit Slips, Too Early to Quantify China Impact’ The Wall Street Journal (24 July 
2013); ‘GlaxoSmithKline Executives in China Confess to Bribery and Tax Violations’ Guardian (11 July 2013) 
15 Leslie Hook and Andrew Jack, ‘GSK is test case in China’s rules laboratory’ Financial Times (15 July 2013) 
16 GSK, ‘GSK Delivers 2012 Core EPS of 112.7p and Returns £6.3 Billion ($10.2billion) to Shareholders’ (6 
February 2013)  
<http://www.gsk.com/content/dam/gsk/globals/documents/pdf/Investors/quarterly-results/2012/Q4-2012-
results-announcement.pdf>; David Barboza, ‘GlaxoSmithKline Is Investigated in China’ The New York Times (1 July 
2013); Michael Martina, ‘Compliance the Buzzword for Foreign Firms in China after Glaxo’ Reuters (17 July 2013) 
17 Jamil Anderlini and Tom Mitchell, ‘Bribery Built into the Fabric of Chinese Healthcare System’ Financial Times 
(24 July 2013) 
18 Stanley Lubman, ‘Business in China: What Does ‘Playing by the Rules’ Mean?’ The Wall Street Journal (22 
December 2009)  
19 Virginia Harrison, ‘China Scandal Takes Toll on Glaxo’ CNNMoney (23 October 2013) 
20 Steven R. Salbu, ‘Transnational Bribery: The Big Questions’ (2001) 21 (2) Northwestern Journal of International 
Law & Business 435, 470 
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bribery as endemic to Chinese business, and therefore tend to tolerate insufficient compliance 
with Chinese and foreign anti-bribery laws.21 Although foreign MNCs may need to adapt to the 
local environment, they must retain their own values.22 It is worth identifying certain social, 
economic and institutional factors that contribute to the corrupt environment in China. 
 
Business courtesies constituting a customary fixture of normal business conduct can present 
challenges in China, where relationship building drives successful business developments.23 As 
a result, China is a high-risk country where offering cash bribes and kickbacks are widespread; 
bribery and business go hand-in-hand in China.24 Transparency International (TI) ranked 
China the 80th out of 176 countries in its 2012 corruption-perceptions index (CPI), which 
reflects how outsiders perceive levels of corruption in China.25 Arguably, Chinese doctors do 
not swear the Hippocratic Oath, and their motivations for professional assistance are financially 
driven rather than being based upon a moral creed.26 The bribing of doctors by pharmaceutical 
companies is an "open secret" in China.27 Chinese patients must have a doctor’s prescription to 
buy regulated medicine, and pharmaceutical sales persons meet regularly with doctors to 
promote their products.28 It is common practice for pharmaceutical firms to offer doctors and 
hospitals bribes to have their products used. One of the primary concerns for MNCs is to 
balance the embedded and pervasive culture of gift-giving in China with foreign anti-
corruptionlaws.29 Foreign MNCs must renew their focus on strengthening global compliance 
programmes to ensure that they are not exposed to such vulnerabilities.30 Apart from the fertile 
 
21 Michael Martina ‘Compliance the Buzzword for Foreign Firms in China after Glaxo’ Reuters (17 July 2013) 
22 Kirk O. Hanson and Stephan Rothlin, ‘Taking Your Code to China’ (2010) 3 (1) Journal of International 
Business Ethics 69, 80 
23 F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant and Jill M. Pfenning, ‘FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and 
Hospitality Challenge’ (2010) 5 Virginia Law & Business Review 33, 35  
24 Feng Jing, ‘Combating Commercial Bribery’ Beijing Review (25 May 2006); “In China’s pharmaceutical industry, 
kickbacks for pharmaceuticals alone approach ¥RMB772 million $126million) of state assets every year, an 
amount equivalent to approximately 16% of the tax revenue for the whole pharmaceutical industry.” 
25 Transparency International ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2012’ (December 2012) 
<http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results> 
26 Dezan Shira, ‘Why Corruption is Inevitable in China’s Pharmaceutical Industry’ Caijing (25 July 2013) 
27 Hongyi Wang and Zhenghua Wang, ‘GSK Corruption Claims Trigger Wider Concerns’ China Daily (3 July 
2013) 
28 Christopher Matthews and Jessica Hodgson, ‘Glaxe Probes China Bribe Claims’ Fidelity (12 June 2013) 
29 Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State’ (2010) 120 The Yale Law Journal Online 
125, 140 
30 Samer Korkor and Nicole Saleem, ‘Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Healthcare Industry 
and Foreign Bribery’s Adverse Consequences for Patients’ (2013) 74 Ohio State Law Journal Furthermore 23, 40 
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soil for corruption in the pharmaceutical industry, the Chinese fragmented drug licensing 
system provides ample opportunity for rent seeking.31 
2.2.2 Institutional Framework: A Highly-Regulated Market 
Corruption in the drugs business is a direct result of the regulatory landscape controlling the 
sale and prescription of drugs.32 The government control of China’s health-care system 
increases the risks for foreign companies.33 Drug prices are set by the Chinese authorities, 
which dictate the margin structure for the state-controlled distributors as well as sub-distributors 
and hospitals.34 Some Chinese officials often solicit or expect a “facilitation payment” merely 
for doing their routine job.35 The direct or indirect extortion put foreign MNCs in a dilemma, 
that is, either taking the risk of prosecution or refusing to pay or risk adverse consequences for 
the business. As local entities are not similarly constrained by stringent anti-bribery laws, a 
Western firm may incur significant costs to avoid the risk of their home law, which arguably 
puts Western companies at a disadvantage.36 In an era when the Chinese market is increasingly 
important, some over-eager MNCs may be tempted to bend the rule of zero tolerance for 
corruption so as to avoid being left out of business opportunities.37 This may, to some extent, 
explain why GSK has failed to make its global compliance procedures compatible to China’s 
more challenging business environment. 
2.3 Arbitrary Prosecution: Protectionism or Politically-Driven Prosecution? 
MNCs may complain that they have been penalised selectively. It is worth ascertaining whether 
the investigations are driven politically or in a protectionist way. Nationalism and protectionism 
have played a part which should not be overestimated. First, foreign MNCs may feel like scapegoats, 
in part, in reaction to the economic downturn and, in part, in an attempt to deflect attention from 
 
31 Leslie Hook, ‘Unorthodox Injections Sustain China’s Healthcare System’ Financial Times (16 July 2013) 
32 Dezan Shira, ‘Why Corruption is Inevitable in China’s Pharmaceutical Industry’ Caijing (25 July 2013) 
33 Samuel Rubenfeld, ‘Chinese Health-Care System Rife with Corruption Risks’ The Wall Street Journal (2 May 
2012); Hannah Beech, ‘How Corruption Blights China’s Health Care System’ Time (2 august 2013) 
34 ‘China’s Bitter Medicine for Foreign Drug Companies’  
<http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-bitter-medicine-foreign-drug-companies/> 
35 Emily N. Strauss, ‘Easing Out” the FCPA Facilitation Payment Exception’ (2013) 93 (1) Boston University Law 
Review 235, 273 
36 Irina Sivachenko, ‘Corporate Victims of "Victimless Crime": How the FCPA's Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled 
with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages Compliance’(2013) 54 (1) Boston College Law Review 393, 
431 
37 Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers (Harper Perennial, 2012) 122 
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China’s own domestic drug concerns.38 The slower economic growth may serve to fuel the public 
resentment toward those foreign multinationals that are scooping substantial profit. With China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), some of the more flagrant barriers imposed 
against foreign MNCs trying to compete on a very uneven playing field have been softened.39 As a 
result, Chinese pharmaceutical companies often find themselves put at a disadvantage against their 
foreign counterparts with world-known brands and reputations.40 Second, China has achieved its 
goals of accumulation of capital. It is a transformative period for the country to upgrade its 
technology and improve governance capacity. It is also the time for China to realise its vast 
economic potential primarily by stimulating its domestic consumption instead of relying heavily on 
exports and investment.41 The time has passed since China had to queue up to attract MNCs, with 
super-national treatments; such as the offering of tax breaks. In this vein, MNCs need China more 
than China needs them.42 When looking for easy targets to fulfil their quotas of corruption-bashing, 
local officials may find it simpler to pick on foreign firms than on local ones that have interwoven 
connections with local or national politicians.43 Although an element of nationalism and even 
protectionism cannot be rooted out, it would not be wise to attribute bribery to such an excuse.  
The judicial system in China is highly politicised.44 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
effectively institutionalised an entire ecosystem of crony capitalism, which renders business and 
politics tightly intertwined.45 The Chinese government is keen to cut the prices of medicines whilst 
trying to provide universal access to healthcare. The rising cost of pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices have been sparking widespread frustration, with national healthcare expenses expected to 
reach $1 trillion annually by 2020.46 Cost-effective health care represents a critical and challenging 
 
38 Simon Denyer, ‘Amid Attacks by Chinese Government and Media, Foreign Companies Get Mixed Signals’ The 
Washington Post (9 August 2013) 
39 Dezan Shira, ‘Why Corruption is Inevitable in China’s Pharmaceutical Industry’ Caijing (25 July 2013) 
40 Shubha Ghosh and Brad Luo, ‘Protection and Enforcement of Well-known Mark Rights in China: History, 
Theory and Future’ (2009) 7(2) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 119, 161  
41 MJ Deen and Nicholas Ward, ‘China pivots its growth strategy to focus on domestic consumption’ Financial Post 
(21 February 2012) 
42 James Moore, ‘Multinationals, Like GSK, Now Need China More than China Needs Them.’ The Independent (16 
July 2013) 
43 ‘GlaxoSmithKline in China: Bitter Pill’ The Economist (20 July 2013) 
44 Victor Nee and Sonja Opper ,’On Politicized Capitalism’ in Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg (eds.) On 
Capitalism (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2007) 93-127 
45 David Barboza and Sharon LaFraniere, ‘Princelings in China Use Family Ties to Gain Riches’ The New York 
Times (17 May 2012) 
46 Franck Le Deu, Rajesh Parekh, et al., ‘Healthcare in China: Entering Uncharted Waters’ (September 2012) 
<http://www.mckinseychina.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/mckinsey-healthcare-in-china.pdf> 
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policy objective, thus, the government’s legitimacy would be jeopardised were it not to deliver 
affordable and accessible healthcare.47  
2.4 Crack-down on Bribery: A Toothless Watchdog? 
There has been more enforcement by the U.S. agencies under the FCPA against Western firms 
operating in China than by the Chinese government itself.48 The U.S. Department of Justice 
(DoJ) has aggressively pursued the pharmaceutical industry for violating the FCPA. Some 
multinational pharmaceutical giants were penalised for alleged FCPA violations based on their 
bribery in China. For instance, Pfizer Inc., Johnson & Johnson and Eli Lilly, have all reached 
FCPA settlements in recent years.49 Although the corrupt business practices of the 
pharmaceutical giants were heavily penalised by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) as well as the Department of Justice (DoJ), most of the incidences of the high profile 
China-related FCPA cases have turned up no parallel Chinese investigations, and have gone 
unpunished by the Chinese enforcement agencies.50 The Chinese authorities have focused 
more on punishing bribe recipients than bribe givers,51 resulting in few actions against foreign 
MNCs paying bribes in China. They have finally escaped scrutiny largely because the anti-
bribery agencies have typically not prosecuted non-Chinese companies for violations of law 
 
47 Michael Martina, ‘Compliance the Buzzword for Foreign Firms in China after Glaxo’ Reuters (17 July 2013) 
48Michael B. Runnels and Adam M. Burton, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and New Governance: 
Incentivising Ethical Foreign Direct Investment in China and Other Emerging Economies’ (2012) 34 Cardozo Law 
Review 295, 327 
49 DoJ, ‘Pfizer H.C.P. Corp. Agrees to Pay $15 Million Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigation’ (7 August 
2012) <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-crm-980.html>; SEC, ‘SEC Charges Pfizer with FCPA 
Violations’ (7 August 2012)  
<http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171483696#.Ugo2ItJazE0>: In Pfizer/Wyeth, 
employees allegedly used bribes to influence doctors at state-owned hospitals to recommend Wyeth nutritional 
products, ensure that the products were made available to new mothers at the hospitals. Pfizer paid a $60 million 
fine in 2012 to settle allegations of making improper payments to government officials and physicians in China. 
SEC, ‘SEC Charges Johnson & Johnson with Foreign Bribery: J&J to Pay $70 Million to Settle Cases Brought by 
SEC and Criminal Authorities’ (7 April 2011) <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-87.htm>; SEC, ‘SEC 
Charges Eli Lilly and Company with FCPA Violations’ (20 December 2012) 
<http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171487116#.UfE2Qm3F2uM>:Employees 
from the company’s China subsidiary had “falsified expense reports in order to provide gifts and cash payments to 
government-employed physicians,” which resulted in a settlement that Eli Lilly had agreed to pay a $29 billion fine. 
50 Rachel Beller, ‘Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can it really reduce corporate fraud 
and improve corporate governance? A Study of the Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Protection Legislation 
in the U.S. and China’ (2011) 7 New York University Journal of Law and Business 873, 929  
51 ‘Former Head of Chinese Drug Watchdog Appeals Death Sentence’ People’s Daily (12 June 2007); One of the 
most striking cases in the pharmaceutical industry was that Xiayu Zheng, former director of China’s State Food & 
Drug Administration (SFDA). He was executed in 2007 after being convicted of taking bribes of ¥RMB 6.49 
million $1.06million) in return for approving hundreds of new medicines, some of which proved to be dangerous. 
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involving corruption of public officials.52 As Transparency International observed, “the 
ineffectiveness of government regulation was initially caused by China’s sole emphasis on 
fighting the “demand side of corruption,” which involved close regulation of public officials but 
ignored the actions of the private sector “suppliers of corruption.”53 Despite rampant 
corruption, the Chinese government has not efficiently prosecuted and punished such conduct. 
The lack of enforcement against foreign violators left observers thinking that the Chinese anti-
bribery laws were little more than a “legal sleeping dog.”54 
This imbalance has begun to change in recent years with the Chinese government launching a 
campaign to crack down on foreign MNCs’ bribery activities.55 The scrutiny of the MNCs 
operating in China has been heightened.56 Multinational pharmaceutical companies in China 
face increasing challenges given that corruption is rampant in China’s health system. Although 
the crackdowns should be seen in a broader context and as a manifestation of developments in 
the legal arena,57 the Chinese enforcement agencies are likely to take a hard line with foreign 
firms and show the teeth of its anti-bribery laws, especially in those markets that have a direct 
and immediate nexus to Chinese consumers.58 The case of GSK represents a notable 
development because it reshaped China’s traditional corruption investigations, demonstrating 
that the enforcement agencies will target bribers as well as officials receiving bribes.59 
 
52 Daniel Chow, ‘The Interplay Between China’s Anti-Bribery Laws and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (2012) 
73 (5) Ohio State Law Journal 1015, 1037 
53 Transparency International, ‘Global Corruption Report 2009: Corruption and the Private Sector 254; Rachel 
Beller, ‘Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can it really reduce corporate fraud and 
improve corporate governance? A Study of the Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Protection Legislation in 
the U.S. and China’ (2011) 7 New York University Journal of Law and Business 873, 929 at 885 
54 Matthew Shabat, ‘SEC Regulation of Attorneys Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Decisions on 
Efficiency and Their Role in International Anti-Bribery Efforts’ (1999) 20 (4) University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law 987, 999  
55 Benjamin Olken and Rohini Pande, ‘Corruption in Developing Countries’ (2012) 4 Annual Review of 
Economics 479, 509 
56 Tom Fox, ‘GSK in China, A Game Changer in Compliance’ Corporate Compliance Insights  
<http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/gsk-in-china.pdf> 
57 David B. Wilkins and Mihaela Papa, ‘The Rise of the Corporate Legal Elite in the BRICS: Implications for Global 
Governance’ (2013) 54 (3) Boston College Law Review 1149, 1184 
58 Kirk O. Hanson and Stephan Rothlin, ‘Taking Your Code to China’ (2010) 3 (1) Journal of International 
Business Ethics 69, 80 
59 Freshfields and Bruckhaus Deringer, ‘Anti-Bribery and Corruption: Frontier Market and Global Enforcement-
An Update on Legislative and Enforcement Developments, 2013’ (September 2013) 
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3 Ministry of Public Security (MPS) v GlaxoSmithKline (2013) 
3.1 Does GSK have Clean Hands? 
GSK has been involved in widespread bribery between 2004 and 2010,60 during which GSK's 
China sales staff provided doctors with speaking fees, cash payments, lavish dinners and all-
expenses-paid trips in return for prescribing medication. Despite GSK’s guarantee of operating 
ethically and with high standards of integrity, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
charged GSK for breaching the anti-bribery laws based on substantial  evidences that the firm 
had used travel agencies as vehicles to commit the flagrant and repeated bribery. 
The  charges against GSK resemble those leveled at other pharmaceutical MNCs by the SEC 
and DoJ,61 which have been looking into  possible violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) relating to sales in China since 2010. GSK paid $3 billion according to a 
healthcare fraud settlement on 2 July 2010.62 The penalty illustrates the upward trend toward 
increased enforcement and harsh penalties.63 GSK has been seeking to repair its corporate 
image after multibillion-dollar settlements with U.S. regulators tied to drug-marketing tactics, 
where the company admitted that its marketing practices relating to some of its drugs were 
illegal.64 It is also executing a five-year corporate integrity agreement, requiring major changes in 
the way its sales force does business.65 
 
It seems that GSK has not been snagged in law that creates a double standard for its business 
practices. Just one year after the criminal and civil charges of its off-label marketing and related 
unlawful promotion of prescription drugs,66 GSK has allegedly uncovered bribery involving 
$450 million that had been funnelled through more than 700 travel agents and other third 
parties during the last six years.67 It has used bribes, kickbacks and other fraudulent means to 
bolster drug sales in China. On 11 July 2013, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) lodged a 
new investigation into the firm. The acceptance of kickbacks from the travel agents or other 
 
60 Laurie Burkitt and Jeanne Whalen, ‘China Targets Big Pharma’ The Wall Street Journal (16 July 2013) 
61 Peter J. Henning, ‘Be Careful What You Wish For: Thoughts on a Compliance Defence under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act’ (2012) 73 (5) Ohio State Law Journal 883 
62 DoJ, ‘GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report 
Safety’ (2 July 2012 <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html> 
63 Robert C. Blume and J. Taylor McConkie, ‘Navigating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Increasing Cost 
of Overseas Bribery’ (1997) 36 (8) The Colorado Lawyer 91, 100 at 97 
64 DoJ, ‘GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report 
Safety Data’ (2 July 2012) <www.justice.gov/opa/gsk-docs.html>; Jeanne Whalen, Devlin Barrett and Peter Loftus, 
‘Glaxo in $3 Billion Settlement’ The Wall Street Journal (3 July 2012) 
65 Wayne M. Carlin, ‘White Collar and Regulatory Enforcement: Emerging Trends and What to Expect in 2013’ 
The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (30 January 2013) 
66 Duff Wilson, ‘Glaxo Settles Cases With U.S. for $3 Billion’ The New York Times (3 November 2011)  
67 Peter Henning, ‘Lessons from the Glaxo Case in China’ The New York Times (29 July 2013) 
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third parties by such executives has constituted another violation of Chinese Criminal Law 
(CCL), since the payment or benefit far exceeded the threshold value of ¥RMB 5,000 ($816).68 
GSK’s reputation has been substantially tarnished. It may be worth examining how much of 
this allegation has been driven by anti-bribery efforts and how much of it is politically-
motivated.69 However, it is not well-justified that the case against GSK represents the targeting 
of foreign companies in competition with domestic industry, rather than an overarching 
crackdown on corrupt practices. Nevertheless, challenging  the anti-bribery prosecution will 
make little sense.  “When in Rome, do as the Romans”, constitutes quite a weak defence in 
criminal proceedings anywhere. Despite bribery being widely considered as a most common 
practice in China’s hyper-competitive pharmaceutical markets, it does not mean that foreign 
MNCs should engage in it. A better practice would be that the foreign MNCs strengthen their 
global compliance programmes to ensure that they are not exposed to similar vulnerabilities in 
the increasingly stringent anti-bribery environment. 
3.2 Parallel Prosecutions  
As possible parallel investigations unfold, MNCs will have to pay more attention to their 
bribery risk management under Chinese anti-bribery law, which presents some unique 
challenges. The charges against GSK may again lead to serious penalties. GSK’s holdings and 
business are under the jurisdiction of the FCPA and the UK Bribery Act 2010, as well as 
China’s anti-corruption laws. The breadth of GSK’s activities could make the company 
vulnerable to enforcement action by both the UK's Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the US 
Department of Justice (DoJ), which can levy heavy penalties under their sweeping respective 
anti-bribery laws if they find evidence of wrongdoing.70 The charges of bribery make the GSK 
case the highest profile probe in China since four executives of mining giant Rio Tinto plc were 
jailed in March 2010 for taking bribes and stealing commercial secrets.71 The current 
prosecution of GSK is apparently the first such parallel investigation undertaken by the 
Chinese government. It provides further evidence that extraterritorial enforcement of anti-
corruption laws is not limited to U.S. government actions. This does not only signal the end of 
that inaction era and the beginning of an industry-wide enforcement sweep, but also signal an 
 
68 CCL Article 163 
69 Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘International Actors and the Promises and Pitfalls of Anti-Corruption Reforms’ (2013) 
34 (3) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 447, 489 
70 Kathrin Hille and John Aglionby ‘China accuses GSK of bribing officials’ Financial Times (11 July 2013) 
71 David Barboza, ‘China Sentences Rio Tinto Employees in Bribe Case’ New York Times (29 March 2010); The 
four executives received jail terms of between seven and 14 years after being found guilty of getting information 
from confidential strategy meetings of the body representing China's steel industry in negotiations with iron ore 
suppliers. 
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inclination by the Chinese government to affirmatively pursue anti-bribery cases.72 Foreign 
MNCs should wake up and accept such a reality that China’s anti-bribery agencies do not turn 
a blind eye to flagrant breaches of its Anti-bribery laws any more. To join the global fight 
against corruption, China has updated its laws to reflect the developing global standard in 
anticorruption enforcement.  A brief overview of anti-bribery laws in China is next.  
4 The Anti-bribery Framework in China 
4.1 The Chinese Criminal Law on Anti-bribery 
The flagrant bribery and corruption have posed a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),73 which could cause “the collapse of the CCP” and the 
downfall of the state.74 In response, China has instituted complex anti-bribery laws from 
criminal and administrative penalties to disciplinary regimes for CCP members to the standard 
adjudication process. The system consists of two main parts: the principal piece of Chinese 
Criminal Law (CCL) and the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL 1993). The latter prohibits 
business parties from engaging in "commercial bribery" by giving money or property to another 
business operator or individual for the purpose of selling or purchasing goods.75 Firms are 
forbidden to give ‘money or property’ for the purpose of gaining a competitive advantage.76 A 
bribery case under the AUCL 1993 is investigated by the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC).77 In addition, it appears that the CCP Regulations on Disciplinary Penalties 
prohibit any official from accepting ‘any gift that might affect his impartial exercise of a public 
function’ without registering receipt of the gift and surrendering it to the state.78 The perceived 
lack of specificity and guidance in the CCL confers considerable discretion to Chinese 
enforcement agencies.79 The SPC and the SPP jointly promulgated a Judicial Interpretation on 
 
72 Amy L. Sommers and Matt T. Morley, ‘Multinational Executives Detained in China Due to Bribery Concerns’ 
Legal Insight (26 July 2013) 
73 Michael J. Boskin, ‘The Global Stake in China’s Anti-Corruption Reform’ Project Syndicate (10 September 2013) 
74 Jaime A. FlorCruz, ‘Corruption as China’s Top Priority’ CNN (7 January 2013) 
75 AUCL 1993 Article 8  
76 The AUCL was adopted in the 3rd Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People’s Congress 
(NPC) on 2 September 1993 and came into effect on 1 December 1993. 
77 AUCL 1993 Article 3 
78Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), CCP Regulations on Disciplinary Penalties (18 February 
2004) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/weekend/2004-02/18/content_1320429.htm>; Patrick Norton, ‘The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: A Minefield for US Companies in China’ China Law & Practice (November 2004) 
79 Irina Sivachenko, ‘Corporate Victims of "Victimless Crime": How the FCPA's Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled 
with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages Compliance’(2013) 54 (1) Boston College Law Review 393, 
431 
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Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of the Law in the Handling of Criminal 
Cases of Bribery on 26 December 2012 (SPC & SPP Interpretation 2012).80  
There are a number of provisions incorporated under the CCL that relate to bribery of public 
officials for an improper interest.81 It constitutes a crime for a person to give "money or 
property”82 to a state functionary for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage.83 The CCL 
defines ‘state functionaries’ as individuals of government agencies who are engaged in public 
service.84 Pursuant to Interpretation 2012, the threshold for a bribe to a state functionary that 
will trigger a criminal investigation is ¥RMB 10,000 ($1632).85 More specifically, the threshold 
for bribery to constitute an offence is ¥RMB 10,000 ($1632) where committed by an 
individual,86 and ¥RMB 200,000 ($32639) by companies.87 The CCL does not contain an 
exception for facilitation payments.88 China has updated its criminal laws to reflect the 
developing global standards in anti-bribery enforcement.89 Given these rather general standards 
and broad prosecutorial discretion, fashioning a set of compliance rules that are not only 
effective in avoiding the legal pitfalls, but also practical and realistic as a business matter will be 
difficult.90  
 
80 The Interpretation 2012 was adopted respectively by the SPC Trial Committee Decree 1547 on 14 May 2012 
and SPP Procurator Committee Decree 77 on 21 August 2012. It came into force on 1 January 2013. 
81 CCL Articles 389-393  
82Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), Opinion on Some Issues Concerning 
the Application of the Law in Criminal Commercial Bribery Cases (20 November 2008): The concept of “property” in the 
crime of bribery under the CCL was clarified to include any “property interest” that can be quantified with a 
monetary value. 
83 CCL Articles 389 
84 CCL Article 93 
85 SPC&SPP Interpretation 2012 Article 1; CCL Article 390 
86 CCL Articles 164, 389 
87 CCL Article 391; SPP, The Threshold for Criminal Prosecution in Bribery Cases (22 December 2000)  
88 The Amendments to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (VIII) was promulgated by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 25 February 2011, and became effective on 1 May 
2011. <http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/cwh/1119/2011-02/25/content_162 5618.htm>; Bribery Act 2010 s6 
89 The newly enacted Amendment of PRC Criminal Law adds a second provision to Article 164 that criminalizes 
bribes given to foreign public officials or officials of an international public organization, which came into effect 
on 1 May 2011. 
90 William L. Rosoff and Yuanming Wang, ‘Recent Developments in Chinese Anti-bribery Laws and Enforcement’ 
(6 August 2013) <http://cdn.akingump.com/images/content/2/4/v2/24261/Recent-Developments-in-Chinese-
Antibribery-Laws-and-Enforcement..pdf> 
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4.2 SPC & SPP Judicial Interpretation 2012  
Under the CCL, the severity of punishment of individuals for bribing government officials 
depends on the degree of culpability.91 The Interpretation 2012 sets out some factors and 
financial thresholds that will determine the level of ‘seriousness’ of the bribery offence, with 
associated penalties for each categorisation from ‘serious’,92 to ‘extraordinarily serious’.93 The 
crime of bribery is “extraordinarily serious” if the amount proffered is more than ¥RMB 1 
million ($163,192);94 or if the amount proffered is more than ¥RMB 500,000 ($81,596), but 
less than ¥RMB1 million($163,192,95 and the defendant has paid bribes to 
(i) more than three people;96 
(ii) to government officials who are responsible for supervising and administering 
matters in relation to food, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing safety or the 
environment, etc. that endanger public health or the security of public property;97 
(iii) to a judicial or administrative authority, thereby interfering with administrative 
law enforcement and judicial justice;98 or 
(iv) the bribes are sourced from the offender’s illegal gains.99  
 
For instance, individuals found to have engaged in “extraordinarily serious” bribery face 
lifetime imprisonment. 100 The Chinese enforcement agencies usually charge individuals, largely 
because of complex pre-conditions for charging an enterprise.101 Although the prosecution of 
companies, as opposed to individuals, has been far less frequent for various evidentiary and 
technical reasons, the government has now fully implemented a database that documents all 
cases of convictions for bribery and lists all parties involved, whether or not those parties have 
been criminally pursued.102 This makes greater sense because it is much easier for foreign 
 
91 CCL Article 390: (i) Payment of bribes is punishable by imprisonment of one month to five years; (ii) If the 
circumstances are severe or if severe damage has been caused to the interests of the State, punishment is  
increased to between 5 and 10 years of imprisonment; and (iii) If the circumstances are extraordinarily severe, the 
defendant is subject to imprisonment of more than 10 years or life imprisonment and all of his/her property may 
also be confiscated.  
92 SPC&SPP Interpretation 2012 Article 2 
93 SPC&SPP Interpretation 2012 Article 4 
94 SPC&SPP Interpretation 2012 Article 4 (1) 
95 SPC&SPP Interpretation 2012 Article 4 (2) 
96 SPC&SPP Interpretation 2012 Article 4 (2) (i) 
97 SPC&SPP Interpretation 2012 Article 4 (2) (iii) 
98 SPC&SPP Interpretation 2012 Article 4 (2) (iv) 
99 SPC&SPP Interpretation 2012 Article 4 (2) (ii) 
100 CCL Article 390 
101 Daniel Chow, ‘China under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (2012) 2 Wisconsin Law Review 573, 607 
102 SPP, Centralizes Database of Bribery Convictions (16 February 2012) 
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MNCs to undertake their risk assessment to avoid potential successor liability. Furthermore, 
«major loss to the national interest»103 shall be deemed to have been caused to the interests of 
the State if the direct economic losses are more than ¥RMB1million ($163,192).104 The 
Interpretation 2012 clarifies a number of key terms and issues under the CCL with respect to 
paying bribes and the consequence of the criminal liability. It provides long-awaited guidance 
and fills gaps in the CCL, with precise financial thresholds and specified aggravating 
circumstances to assist the courts in producing fair and predictable decisions.  
4.3 Implication from the Distinction between the CCL and the Interpretation 2012 
Despite the lack of separation of powers in China, the SPC plays a pivotal role in China’s 
judicial practice, with a particular regard to its indispensable guidance in the judicial 
enforcement.105 Arguably, the SPC is not constitutionally mandated with the power to interpret 
the law, but issues statute-like judicial interpretations only when the NPC delegates it the power 
to do so.106 Generally, Interpretation 2012 is equivalent to law, although it cannot make new 
rules without the existing legal ground.107 The Interpretation 2012 does provide significant 
insight into how Chinese judicial organs interpret key principles of anti-bribery laws. The more 
detailed guidance allows lower-level courts to make more consistent and predictable decisions. 
In this vein, the Judicial Interpretation helps to insure national standards of justice. 
Furthermore, Judicial Interpretation enables the court to adapt promptly to legal developments 
without necessarily revising the relevant laws through the NPC.108 Given China’s long standing 
civil law jurisdiction, however, the Interpretation 2012 may impede judges to exercise their 
discretions in making a decision. Keith and Lin observed that the SPC’s interpretation has 
“narrowed the function of the Court to a more tightly disciplined judicial role as well as for 
plugging the holes in legal process and structure by creating guiding case law and supporting the 
freedom of judge’s decision making.”109 Such a unique approach in China’s judicature 
 
103 CCL 390 
104 SPC&SPP Interpretation 2012 Article 3 
105 The Organic Law of People’s Court Article 33; The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress on Strengthening Legal Interpretation (1981) Article 2 : “Issues of applying laws and  
regulations in court proceedings shall be interpreted by the Supreme People’s Court” 
106 Constitution of the PRC Article 67; PRC Law on Legislation Article 42; Randall Peerenboom, China's Long 
March toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2002) 317 
107 Chengguang Wang, ‘Law-Making Functions of the Chinese Courts: Judicial Activism in a Country of Rapid 
Social Changes’ (2006) 3 Frontiers of Law in China 29  
108 Björn Ahl, ‘Retaining Judicial Professionalism: The New Guiding Cases Mechanism of the Supreme People’s 
Court’ (2014) 216 The China Quarterly 1-19 
109 Ronald Keith and Zhiqiu Lin, ‘Judicial interpretation of China’s Supreme People’s Court as “secondary law” 
with special reference to criminal law’ (2009) 23 (2) China Information 223, 256 at 229 
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mechanism may be arguably referred to as codification of SPC’s judicial interpretation.110 This 
may result in the discretion of local procuratorate and court to be further restricted. In the 
pursuit of rule of law and the judicial independence,111 it remains a long-standing controversy as 
to whether the current approach would strike a balance between the facilitation of judicial 
efficiency and the enhancement of the judges’ description in the decision making.  
5 The Anti-Bribery Framework in the United States:   
The Remit of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
5.1 American and Foreign companies under the FCPA 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is a far-reaching statute which is aggressively 
enforced.112 It forbids bribing foreign government officials to gain illicit interests. The anti-
bribery provision of the FCPA prohibits U.S. ‘issuers,’ and their officers, directors and agents 
from bribing foreign officials with ‘anything of value’ to corruptly influence an official decision 
or to obtain a business benefit.113 It is illegal for companies with significant U.S. operations to 
bribe foreign officials in exchange for business.114 The FCPA imposes certain accounting 
requirements on foreign issuers in the U.S,115 which provision is designed to ensure corporate 
accountability.116 Maintaining an effective compliance programme will not only mitigate a 
firm’s exposure to FCPA liability, but also minimise the risk of enforcement action in case of a 
systematic failure to prevent a violation.  
Foreign firms registered with the SEC must comply with U.S. securities laws and rules, 
including requirements that the issuer maintains certain books and records.117 The FCPA’s anti-
 
110 Ronald Keith and Zhiqiu Lin, ‘Judicial interpretation of China’s Supreme People’s Court as “secondary law” 
with special reference to criminal law’ (2009) 23 (2) China Information 223, 256 at 224 
111 Taisu Zhang, ‘The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting the Supreme People’s Court of China’ (2012) 25 (1) 
Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1, 61 
112 Mike Koehler, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence’ (2010) 43 
Indiana Law Review 389, 421 
113 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq  
114 H. Lowell Brown, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Redux: The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign’ 
Corrupt Practices Act’ (1994) 12 (2) Berkeley Journal of International Law 260, 290 
115 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006) 
116 15 U.S.C. § 78m; SEC, ‘SEC Sanctions Statoil for Bribes to Iranian Government Official’ (13 October 2006)  
<http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-174.htm> 
117 SEC and DoJ, A Resource Guide to the FCPA U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (14 November 2012) 42-45; Stuart 
H. Deming, ‘The Potent and Broad-Ranging Implications of the Accounting and Record-Keeping Provisions of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (2006) 96 (2) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 465, 502 
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bribery provisions prohibit issuers118 from giving anything of value to a foreign official for the 
purpose of influencing the official’s actions or decision-making.119 Designed to operate in 
tandem with the anti-bribery provisions,120 the FCPA requires companies whose securities are 
listed in the U.S. to meet its accounting provisions, requiring the company covered to  
(a) make and keep books and records that accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions of the corporation; and  
(b)  devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls.121  
 
The issuers are responsible for ensuring that their consolidated subsidiaries and affiliates 
comply with the accounting provisions,122 reflecting the breadth and complexity of  the FCPA’s 
extraterritorial reach. For instance, it is illegal for foreign issuers in the NYSE to bribe foreign 
officials in exchange for business,123 even if it may be common practice in China. Since the 
term "issuer" covers any business entity that is registered124 or required to file reports,125 a 
foreign firm whose American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are listed on a U.S. exchange is 
recognised as an "issuer”, too. It demonstrates that the government has a commitment to 
vigorously enforce the FCPA against all international business whose conduct falls within such 
a wide scope.126 It is no wonder that many foreign subsidiaries of U.S. issuers based in China 
have been charged with conspiring to violate the FCPA.127 Although GSK is a multinational 
company based in the UK, its extensive holdings in the U.S. make it subject to U.S. law no 
matter where the bribery actually takes place. In this vein, the GSK bribes in China fall within 
the jurisdiction for purposes of the FCPA.  
 
118 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) 
119 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a); 78dd-3(a) 
120 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq 
121 15 U.S.C. § 78m 
122 SEC and DoJ, A Resource Guide to the FCPA U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (14 November 2012) 43 
123 United States v. Statoil, ASA, 1:06-cr-00960-RJH-ALL (S.D.N.Y.2006); DoJ, ‘U.S. Resolves Probe against Oil 
Company that Bribed Iranian Official’ (13 October 2006) 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/06_crm_700.html> 
124 15 U.S.C. § 78l 
125 15 U.S.C. § 78o (d) 
126 Robert C. Blume and J. Taylor McConkie, ‘Navigating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Increasing Cost 
of Overseas Bribery’ (1997) 36 (8) The Colorado Lawyer 91, 100 at 97 
127 United States v. DaimlerChrysler China Ltd., No. 10-cr-66 (D.D.C. 2010); United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A., 
No. 10-cr-20906 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010) 
  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
Issue 2014#2 
17
5.2 Broader Interpretation of Foreign Official  
Under the FCPA, a foreign official includes any officer or employee of a foreign government or 
any instrumentality.128 The definition has been further clarified in a DoJ & SEC jointly-issued 
Guide that any employee of a foreign-government instrumentality, including state-owned 
hospitals, is a foreign official, in light of their ownership, control, status and function.129 
Consistently, the term "state functionaries" is widely defined in China to include not only 
public officials, but also employees in state-owned enterprises and other state institutions and 
persons who perform public services authorised by the state.130 An entity is unlikely to qualify as 
an instrumentality if a government does not own or control a majority of its shares, minority-
state-owned entities are "instrumentalities" only in exceptional circumstances.131 The DoJ and 
the SEC take an expansive view and consider doctors who are employees of overseas state-
owned hospitals to be "foreign officials".132 According to Pfizer, government officials included 
doctors who held positions on registration committees and other employees of “hospitals, 
clinics, and pharmacies in countries with national healthcare systems.”133 In this regard, the 
majority of Chinese companies are state-owned/controlled or are instrumentalities of the 
government.134 Conceptually, all employees of state-run hospitals should fall within the remit of 
the term of foreign officials.135  
 
128 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) 
129 DoJ & SEC, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (14 November 2012) 19-21 
130 CCL Article 93 
131 United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A., No. 10-cr-20906 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010); SEC and DoJ, ‘A Resource 
Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (14 November 2012) 21 
132 SEC and DoJ, A Resource Guide to the FCPA U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (14 November 2012); DoJ, ‘Pfizer 
H.C.P Corp. Agrees to Pay $15million Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigation’ (7 August 2012) 
<http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-crm-980.html> 
133 United States of America v Pfizer H.C.P. Corporation (7 August 2012) District Court for Columbia 
<www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/.../pfizer/2012-08-07-pfizer-dpa.pdf>; U.S. Securities Exchange Committee v 
Pfizer INC. (2012) District Court for Columbia  
<www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2012-152-pfizer.pdf > 
134 Court E. Golumbic and Jonathan P. Adams, ‘The “Dominant Influence” Test: The FCPA's “Instrumentality” 
and “Foreign Official” Requirements and the Investment Activity of Sovereign Wealth Funds’ (2011) 39 (1) 
American Journal of Criminal Law 1, 51 
135 Mike Koehler, ‘Why Compliance with the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Matters in China’ (February) 2008 
China Law & Practice 54, 56 
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5.3 Exceptions and Affirmative Defences  
5.3.1 The Narrow Formulation of the Facilitation Payment Exception 
The contours of the FCPA's facilitating payments exception have been long debated,136 which 
provides an exception for payments made to further “routine governmental action.”137 It would 
not constitute an FCPA violation in the context of “reasonable” and “bona fide” expenditures 
directly related to promotional or performance functions.138 
One exception to the anti-bribery provisions is the ‘facilitation/grease payment’ exception, 
which is exempt from FCPA liability.139 The sole exception is for “facilitating or expediting 
payments” to government officials who perform “routine governmental action”,140 which refers 
to actions that are ordinarily and commonly performed by the foreign official and do not entail 
any decision making or discretion.141 It has been typically defined in terms of "non-discretionary 
acts," but court decisions and the statute's terms have left significant ambiguity as to what 
qualifies.142 There is no universally accepted standard of what constitutes a permissible 
facilitation payment. The conception remains unclear with particular regard to how a company 
should treat gift-giving as a deep-rooted tradition exists in China’s cultural contexts.143 It is safer 
to reinforce the narrow formulation of the facilitation payments exception.144 
5.3.2 Affirmative Defences 
The first affirmative defence applies where the payment at issue “was lawful under the written 
laws and regulations of the foreign official’s country.”145 Notably, common conduct, such as the 
 
136 Andrew Brady Spalding, ‘Four Unchartered Corners of Anti-Corruption Law: In Search of Remedies to the 
Sanctioning Effect’ (2012) 2 Wisconsin Law Review 661, 688 
137 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) 
138 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2) (2006)  
139 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b) and (f)(3) [Section 30A of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934] 
140 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), and 78dd-3(b) 
141 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3) 
142 Irina Sivachenko, ‘Corporate Victims of “Victimless Crime”: How the FCPA's Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled 
with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages Compliance’(2013) 54 (1) Boston College Law Review 393, 
431 
143 Michael B. Runnels and Adam M. Burton, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and New Governance: 
Incentivising Ethical Foreign Direct Investment in China and Other Emerging Economies’ (2012) 34 Cardozo Law 
Review 295, 327 
144Arthur F. Mathews, ‘Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate Internal 
Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlements’ (1998) 18 (2) Northwestern 
Journal of International Law & Business 303, 456 
145 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), and 78dd-3(c)(1) 
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overwhelmingly pervasive practice of gift-giving, is insufficient to satisfy this requirement.146 
This virtually refutes the unlawful approach in China, that is, “ in Rome, do as the Romans 
do”.147 Despite the Chinese culture of gift-giving, Chinese law explicitly bars government 
officials from accepting lavish gifts.148 Second, the expenditures "will not give rise to prosecution 
only if they are reasonable, bona fide and directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or 
explanation of products or services or the execution or performance of a contract."149 Regardless 
of the Guide, many companies are grappling to address where to draw a line between 
“reasonable and bona fide” payments and those that may constitute a violation of the law.150 The 
FCPA contains no de minimis for prohibited gifts or payments, including both tangible and 
intangible benefit.151 The applicability of the affirmative defence for reasonable and bona fide 
expenditures necessarily requires a fact-specific analysis.152 In practice, DoJ and SEC have 
focused on small payments and gifts only when they comprise part of a systemic or long-
standing course of conduct that evidences a scheme to corruptly pay foreign officials to obtain 
or retain business."153 Notably, the tension between China’s aims of preventing corruption 
whilst not penalising modern business practices, such as legitimate corporate hospitality for a 
bona fide business purpose, creates a significant grey area.154 As to the evidential requirement, a 
defendant bears the burden of proof that the payment falls within one of the above two 
categories.155 It is illustrative to look into GSK’s compliance programmes before determining 
whether its conduct could trigger the FCPA violations.  
 
146 Alejandro Posadas, ‘Combating Corruption under International Law’ (2000) 10 Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law 345, 414 
147 Chen Weihua, ‘Multinationals under scrutiny for corruption’ China Daily (8 September 2010) 
148 CCL Article 389 
149 SEC and DoJ, ‘A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (14 November 2012) 24 
150Andrew Brady Spalding, ‘Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions against 
Emerging Markets’ (2010) 62 (2) Florida Law Review 351, 427 
151 SEC, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (14 November 2012) 15 
152 SEC and DoJ, ‘A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (14 November 2012) 24 
153 SEC and DoJ, ‘A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (14 November 2012) 15 
154 Margaret Ryznar and Samer Korkor, ‘Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United States and United Kingdom: A 
Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing’ (2011) 76 (2) Missouri Law Review 415, 453 
155 Barbara Black, ‘The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption Is Not Part of the 
SEC's Mission’ (2012) 73 (5) Ohio State Law Journal 1093, 1119 
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5.4 Compliance Programmes under the FCPA 
The DoJ and SEC‘s enforcement of the FCPA has been extraordinarily aggressive, which 
represents a primary compliance concern facing most MNCs.156 A competent compliance 
programme is usually considered as a mitigating factor in determining whether to charge a 
company and the extent of any penalty.157 The SEC & DoJ’s joint Guide provides a useful 
resource for evaluating an effective compliance programme, in which the enforcement agencies 
provide appropriate credit to corporate compliance efforts. 
The Guide illustrates a roadmap of DoJ and SEC’s expectations regarding corporate compliance 
programmes.158 Both enforcement agencies have been reluctant to create a formal compliance 
defence, arguing that the adequacy of the procedures utilised by the company is assessed in casu 
in the actual process.159 A company may still be held liable for an FCPA violation even if it has 
conducted a due diligence check of a third party as part of its corporate compliance 
programmes.160 This may seem contradictory to the concept of both reasonableness and 
foreseeability which are firmly rooted in law of due process.161 Despite the lack of a guaranteed 
formal defence, the rigorous anti-bribery compliance programmes reduce the likelihood of acts 
of bribery and can serve to mitigate the severity of any penalty imposed under the FCPA.162 
Furthermore, DoJ and SEC provide that “in a global marketplace, an effective compliance 
programme is a critical component of a company’s internal controls and is essential to detecting 
and preventing FCPA violations.”163  
While the Guide did not adopt an absolute compliance defence to corporate liability,164 it seems 
that SEC and DoJ are truly committed to giving meaningful credit to corporate compliance 
 
156 Jessica Tillipman, ‘A House of Cards Falls: Why “Too Big to Debar” is All Slogan and Little Substance’ (2012) 
80 Fordham Law Review Res Gestae 49, 58 at 53 
157 James Barta and Julia Chapman, ‘Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (2012) 49 (2) American Criminal Law Review 
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efforts in the FCPA context.165 When appropriately designed and effectively implemented, a 
robust compliance programme presents a real opportunity to prevent questionable conduct 
before it occurs. This stance is perfectly enshrined in the Guide that enforcement agencies 
“place a high premium on self-reporting, along with cooperation and remedial efforts, in 
determining the appropriate resolution of FCPA matters."166 Even so, the Guide does not 
provide a bright-line rule on whether companies could use compliance programmes as a 
defence against criminal prosecution.167 Both SEC and DoJ view a company’s prompt response 
to the discovery and immediate self-reporting as commendable.168 It is imperative that 
companies implement robust FCPA compliance programmes which are well-designed and 
tailored to the companies’ specific business operations, geography and areas of corruption risk 
and that they are enforced.169 
5.5 Evaluation of the Actions of GSK under the FCPA Provisions:  
The Interplay between the Two Provisions? 
5.5.1 Anti-Bribery Provisions 
GSK’s headquarters are in the UK, but it meets the definition of an «issuer» in the US. 
Therefore it is also subject to the FCPA,170 which makes it potentially liable to penalties under 
the US anti-bribery laws.  
Criminal penalties for violations of the FCPA have been increased, under which the anti-
bribery fine for a firm was raised from $1 million to $2 million and for individuals from 
$10,000 to $100,000.171 The maximum imprisonment for bribery for an individual remained 
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five years.172 The FCPA also provides for civil penalties of up to $10,000 for violations of the 
bribery provisions.173 As a foreign issuer, GSK could only be subject to the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions to the extent a “means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” were used in 
connection with any improper payment scheme.174 GSK certainly would violate the FCPA if it 
evinced a corrupt intent,175 which includes conscious disregard and deliberate ignorance.176 The 
term of “knowing” is defined broadly as basically being aware that a payment will raise red flags 
and not taking any avoidable measures.177 In this case, GSK knowingly gave cash and some 
other monetary incentives to state-owned hospitals, and kept the money in its coffers rather 
than truthfully recording it in its accounts,178 GSK could, on principle, be criminally liable for 
bribing doctors. Despite China’s pervasive customary gift-giving, GSK could not refer to the 
affirmative defence that “its payment is lawful under the laws of the foreign country”,179 because 
China criminalises the kind of payment identified as bribery.180  
5.5.2  Accounting Provisions 
The ‘Books and Records and Internal Control” FCPA provisions, together known as the 
accounting provisions, are enforced by the SEC and apply to any company listed on a U.S. 
stock exchange.181 The Guide makes it clear that an issuer’s books and records include those of 
its consolidated subsidiaries and affiliates.182 Thus, GSK’s obligations under the FCPA extend 
to ensuring that its consolidated subsidiaries and affiliates in China comply with the FCPA’s 
accounting provisions. Since bribery is often disguised on a company’s books and rerecorded 
through mischaracterisation, GSK should under the accounting provisions of the FCPA have 
ensured that costs and expenses had been accurately recorded in the company’s books and 
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records which fairly reflected the issuer's transactions.183 Failure to maintain accurate books and 
records may result in both civil and criminal liability.184 Engaging in systemic efforts to falsify its 
corporate books and records and knowingly failing to enforce and circumventing existing 
internal control would violate the accounting provisions.  
Notably, a payment that does not violate the anti-bribery provisions may nonetheless violate the 
accounting provisions if inaccurately recorded or attributable to an internal control 
deficiency.185 In reality, the accounting provisions may provide a secondary offence for 
prosecution charges,186 and violations thereof may include commercial bribes that would 
typically fall outside of the ‘foreign official’ caveat otherwise needed for liability.187 Accounting 
provisions violations may result in fines of up to $25 million for a company, and $5 million 
and/or imprisonment of up to 20 years for culpable individuals.188 Thus, in theory, the SEC 
could invoke the accounting provisions against GSK for bribery of its Chinese subsidiary, 
because the payments were not accurately and sufficiently recorded, and because GSK and its 
subsidiary lacked reasonable controls to prevent, detect or correct such corrupt conduct.189 In 
order to limit legal exposure, it is imperative for GSK to implement and enforce an effective 
compliance programme. Charges by the Chinese MPC  potential charges by the DoJ and SEC 
could, if proven, put GSK also at risk of prosecution under the Bribery Act of 2010 in the UK. 
6 The Anti-Bribery Framework in the United Kingdom:  
The  UK Bribery Act 
6.1 A New Strict Liability Corporate Offence  
The UK Bribery Act 2010 represents a most significant reformulation of the UK’s anti-bribery 
laws.190 It adds a set of compliance requirements parallel but not identical to those of the FCPA 
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that affect MNCs doing business overseas.191 To invoke a defence, a company must have 
adequate procedures in place designed to prevent persons associated with it from committing 
bribery.192 Unlike the controversial exception under the FCPA, there is no exemption for 
facilitation payments which can constitute bribery of another person,193 or bribery of a foreign 
public official194 and can trigger the failure to prevent bribery offences.195 
The Bribery Act 2010 creates a new criminal offence for failure to prevent bribery by a person 
associated with the organisation, which aims to be an even more stringent anti-bribery act than 
the FCPA.196 The UK Bribery Act 2010 makes it illegal to either pay or receive an advantage 
to/from another person with the intent to: 
i) induce a person to perform improperly a relevant function or activity;197 or 
ii) reward a person for the improper performance of a relevant function or activity.198  
 
The Bribery Act 2010 essentially makes it a crminal offence for a person to bribe a foreign 
public official,199 which also applies to a company associated with a person who bribes.200 Bribes 
carried out by third party associates may not constitute grounds for a defence of ignorance by 
the covered company because it may be assumed that such a company will have appropriately 
vetted its partners before engaging in business.201 Prosecutors do not have to demonstrate prior 
knowledge, or ‘corrupt intent’ on the part of the company or its officials to charge them under 
the Bribery Act 2010.202  
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The Bribery Act 2010 does not include a carve-out for facilitation payments, which, although 
exempt from the FCPA, are prohibited under the Bribery Act 2010.203 The Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO) Guidance reaffirms the zero tolerance -approach to facilitation payments 
irrespective of their size and frequency.204 Nevertheless, reasonable corporate hospitality is not 
something that is prohibited. Bona fide hospitality, promotional or other legitimate business 
expenditure is recognised as an established and important part of doing business.205 Notably, 
bribes may sometimes be disguised as legitimated business expenditure.206 Any concerns about 
criminalising reasonable corporate hospitality would be addressed in the prosecutorial 
discretion.207 A broad test used is: whether it is likely to influence someone to make a decision 
that they might not otherwise make.208  
The anti-bribery enforcement actions often involve overseas third parities making improper 
payment on behalf of a company.209 Potential liability of GSK under the UK Bribery Act 2010 
results from its extraterritorial effect, the extent to which GSK has instigated a review of all 
third party relationships appears vital.210 Any company, wherever incorporated, which “carries 
on a business, or part of a business” in the UK falls within the Bribery Act’s remit.211 A 
corporate offence can be committed irrespective of whether the acts or omissions which form 
part of the offence take place in the UK or elsewhere.212 Prosecutors will be able to tackle the 
overseas operations of any company that conducts commerce in the UK, seeking unlimited 
fines for those suspected of bribing foreign public officials or buying influence of commercial 
counterparts and pursuing company executives with the threat of up to 10 years in prison.213 
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6.2 Statutory Defence to the Corporate Offence: Law in Place ≠ Law in Practice  
The Bribery Act 2010 contains the strictest laws against corruption, but enforcement has been 
minimal since it was passed in 2010.214 Arguably, it consists of a safe harbour provision for a 
corporation, that is, it has instituted in place “adequate procedures” to prevent such bribes 
from occurring.215 A company will not be liable if it can prove, on the balance of probabilities, 
that adequate procedures were in place to prevent persons associated with the company from 
paying bribes.216 This is in contrast to the U.S. approach where compliance procedures are 
evaluated as part of the charging process, not as a defence.217 The statutory defence appears to 
soften the enivsioned “strict liability” for all company operations.218 It seems that by putting 
such an affirmative defence in place, companies may well go down the paper compliance 
defence route and not dedicate the time and resources to make it compatibly effective.219 
In respect to the charges against GSK in China, an irrefutible point is that GSK admittedly has not 
followed its own stated protocols.220 GSK may try to defend itself by attributing to its 
compliance which has been challenged by the scale of the company's growth in China.221 If 
GSK could prove that it "had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons 
associated with [the company] from undertaking such conduct",222 it could escape a criminal 
prosecution, although this is quite a high hurdle to overcome. It remains ambiguous as to what 
“adequate procedures”223 can be put in place as a defence against the corporate offence of 
failing to prevent bribery. Even so, a prerequisite condition for GSK to rely on the statutory 
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defence is that it must prove that GSK has not only put adequate procedures in place, but also 
has effectively enforced them.224 
7 GSK’s Dysfunctional Internal Compliance Regimes 
7.1 Internal Compliance Mechanism: A Code on the Books but Not in Practice  
MNCs usually have strict internal controls, such as limits on gift value to doctors, 
entertainment fees, or a number of days limit for organising overseas trips for doctors so that 
gift giving or entertaining is not defined as bribery.225 Indeed, GSK’s Code of Conduct states 
explicitly that:  
 
“The GSK attitude towards corruption in all its forms is simple: it is one of zero 
tolerance, whether committed by GSK employees, officers, complementary workforce or 
third parties acting for or on behalf of the company… GSK has an active system of 
internal management controls to identify company risks, issues and incidents with 
appropriate corrective actions taken….provides the framework for these internal 
controls, to ensure significant risks are escalated to the proper levels of senior 
management.” 226 
The above code should, in principle, be aimed at identifying potential compliance risks with 
embedded preventive measures before serious problems arise, such as massive fines, long-
running monitor-ships and harm to reputation.227 Assumingly, the compliance programme 
could enable the company to detect wrongdoings in response appropriately to flagrant and 
systematic bribery. 228 
In reality, GSK HQ received information about widespread bribery in China in January 2013. 
However, just a week before the Chinese government detained the GSK employees, GSK HQ 
official stated that they had investigated and found no evidence of bribery and corruption.229 
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Many UK companies would not stand detailed scrutiny should they be investigated. Much 
worse, they are notoriously defensive in response to any claim, challenge or allegation. The 
structural inefficiency ensures much time and energy is expended and heavy costs incurred 
trying to maintain an artificial separation “on the books” for what is, in reality, a single 
organization.230 As sophisticated as they are, such an internal compliance mechanism is in 
place, but surprisingly futile.231 GSK found no evidence of wrongdoing after completing a four-
month investigation into a whistle-blower’s claims of corruption and bribery, which clearly 
indicates a lack of immediate remediation in response to an emergent crisis.232 GSK should 
have ensured that it had implemented effective anti-bribery compliance systems. However, GSK 
has not adequately addressed applicable anti-bribery and corruption rules, neither has it 
conducted an adequate anti-bribery risk assessment.233  
7.2 The Corporate Rogue Employees Defence to FCPA Liability  
As an additional enforcement tool, a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) has been used in 
connection with Morgan Stanley’s anti-bribery efforts.234 SEC and DoJ have declined to pursue 
charges against the company, where one of its executives “used a web of deceit” to evade the 
investment bank’s efforts to maintain adequate anti-corruption internal controls.235 The case 
involved a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE), which is at the heart of  a growing number of 
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FCPA enforcement actions.236 Peterson, a former managing director based in Shanghai, bribed 
a Chinese government official to illegally win business. Peterson has been characterised as a 
“rogue” employee, whose deceptions circumvented Morgan Stanley’s robust internal control. 
Ignoring his fiduciary duties, Peterson made every effort to enrich himself and the Chinese 
government official millions of dollars through a matrix of off-shore shell companies and 
unknowing payment by Morgan Stanley. The SEC and DoJ found no wilful blindness on the 
part of Morgan Stanley. Given the bank’s adequate compliance programme, along with its 
voluntary disclosure of the misconduct and cooperation with the U.S. government’s 
investigation, no FCPA enforcement action has been taken against the bank. This decision has 
profound implications for cases involving executives and foreign officials charged with FCPA 
violations, which is also instructive for multinational companies in several respects. 
In Peterson, a rigorous compliance programme protected Morgan Stanley from the actions of an 
employee that violated the FCPA.237 Self-reporting has particularly been one of the significant 
factors weighted in the agencies’ exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Morgan Stanley had 
maintained a system of internal controls and enforced its anti-bribery polices consistently, 
which provided reasonable assurances that its employees were not bribing government 
officials.238 DoJ and SEC gave the bank unusual credit for its longstanding and comprehensive 
FCPA compliance programmes, voluntary reporting of the matter and its extensive cooperation 
with the agencies’ investigations. It should be noted that  "the existence and effectiveness" of the 
compliance program, and "the company's remedial actions”, where the source of credit.239 
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settlement with the SEC included surrendering a $3.4 million interest in Shanghai real estate 
and $250,000 in damages, a permanent bar from the securities industry and 9 months in a U.S. 
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jail.243 Due to the bank’s robust and well-enforced system of internal controls, neither the DoJ 
nor SEC charged Morgan Stanley itself, highlighting the bank's effective ethics and compliance 
programme as the primary basis for the decision.244 This provides a perfect example to confirm 
the value of well-formulated and meticulously implemented corporate compliance policies in 
deflecting the results of FCPA enforcement actions at the entity level.245  
The assessment of risk is fundamental to developing a strong compliance programme.246 The 
compliance programme is designed to effectively militate against violations, along with its 
rigorous periodic review. Paradoxically, it would be difficult to monitor all sales practices. No 
compliance program can ever prevent all criminal activity by a corporation’s employees.247 
There will always be employees who decide to take matters into their own hands, and even the 
best compliance program may not stop fraud or corruption from occurring.248 Morgan Stanley 
not only discovered the violations and reported it, but also cooperated fully in the investigation 
by the SEC and DoJ. It is the bank’s pre-existing ethics and compliance programme that made a 
decisive difference for the DoJ and SEC not to prosecute it. This case underscores the 
importance of establishing adequate and effective internal anti-bribery controls for global 
companies in protecting both the entity and individual personnel from such enforcement. The 
Morgan Stanley case illustrates that an effective compliance program can provide companies 
facing FCPA enforcement actions with tangible benefits in the form of a more favourable 
settlement term.249 
Could the Morgan Stanley rule apply to GSK? Enforcement agencies can give meaningful credit 
to a company which in good faith applies a comprehensive and risk-based compliance 
programme,250 on the condition that the company did devote greater resources in higher-risk 
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areas, such as China. In this vein, the quality and effectiveness of the compliance programme 
plays a vital role for the agencies to determine whether the company could be given credit 
despite a confirmed violation. It remains uncertain as to whether GSK could use the defence 
against the  failure to prevent the actions of its employees in China.251 GSK may raise a defence 
by showing that it has taken reasonable steps to prevent wrongdoing, although it is ultimately 
powerless if somebody really wants to break the law.  
GSK seems to have adequate systems in place for supervising adherence to those rules. The 
practical challenges of effectively implementing such programmes, however, should not be 
underestimated.252 It appears that having a best practices compliance program without effective 
implementation did not lead to GSK doing business more ethically. As stated above, GSK 
conducted a four month internal investigation which yielded no evidence of bribery. This is 
indicative of a dysfunctional compliance system. GSK may encounter two challenges: proving 
rigorousness of its earlier investigation and giving reasons why the internal procedures failed to 
detect the flagrant and systemic violations.253 The likely  inability to meet the first challenge and 
excusing the resulting inaction will make GSK vulnerable to enforcement action by the UK’s 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) and Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), both of which can levy severe penalties under their sweeping anti-bribery 
laws, i.e. Bribery Act 2010 and the FCPA.254  
While the authorities have discretion, it is more likely in the public interest to prosecute cases 
where there has been a systemic and major breach of corruption laws.255 After all, a parent is 
liable for bribery by a subsidiary’s employees on the ground that it has sufficient knowledge and 
control of its subsidiary’s actions.256 Since GSK has confessed to authorising and participating 
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in systemic bribery in China,257 it will have more difficulty in proving that it had sufficient 
controls to prevent corruption.  It appears that GSK has knowingly and wilfully failed to 
implement anti-bribery compliance measures and reaped financial gains from prohibited 
activities.258 For its lack of due diligence, GSK could be held liable for failure to oversee its 
subsidiary.259  
8 Make Global Compliance Programmes Compatible in China 
8.1 Challenges Arising from Jurisdictional Gaps  
In the new era of growing international enforcement, many MNCs have been involved in long-
running FCPA investigations covering multiple locations around the world.260 The increased 
cooperation between foreign governments will further expose companies to potential liability in 
multiple jurisdictions.261 It is never enough to emphasise the significance of implementing 
adequate and effective compliance programmes. Despite the Bribery Act 2010 and FCPA’s 
extraterritorial reach, the anti-bribery laws may not put Anglo-American companies at a 
disadvantage.262 Instead, the tough anti-bribery laws may help them compete in China. The 
Western firms would gain a reputation for not paying bribes, which ultimately reduce costs for 
all concerned.263 Although an ethical company incurs significant costs to avoid the risk of 
possible liability, the compliance to anti-bribery laws may prevent real and lasting advances in 
anti-bribery,264 as Chinese entities are not similarly constrained. In addition, there is a great 
need to cultivate a dynamic and strong culture of compliance, which should encourage "ethical 
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law" and help "prevent, detect, remediate, 
and report misconduct."265 Rigorous due diligence procedures should also be used to assess the 
adequacy of a company's compliance programme in dealing with overseas third parties as well as 
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its subsidiaries.266 It remains questionable how GSK has localised its global anti-bribery 
compliance programmes in China.  
Given the extent of GSK’s systemic and egregious malpractices, China and the U.K. would 
seem to have a greater and more direct interest in the conduct at issue compared to the U.S. 
Accusations by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the American DoJ and SEC 
could, if proven, put GSK at risk of prosecution by U.K. authorities under the Bribery Act 2010 
at home, despite its incorporation and the bribes that have taken place in China. The UK, U.S. 
and China are parties and are subject to the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCC),267 which, among other things, stipulates legal and investigative cooperation in 
combating bribery. The start of the first such parallel investigation indicates that China may be 
embarking on a more active and cooperative path.268 Most MNC’s holdings and business are 
under the jurisdiction of the FCPA, the Bribery Act, and China’s anti-corruption laws.269 The 
FCPA only prosecutes against the bribery of foreign officials, although the definition of ‘foreign 
official’ remains very vague,270 but under Chinese and British laws, an MNC’s senior executives 
could also be charged for accepting bribes.271 It should be noted that a corporate compliance 
policy which has satisfied the FCPA may not be sufficient for compliance with the U.K. 
adequate procedures guidance published by the SFO.272 It is likely that the GSK case will set a 
precedent for the future interplay of multinational anti-corruption law.273 It remains to be seen 
whether China enforcement agencies will draw on the wealth of bribery evidence and 
admissions generated in most DoJ, SEC and SFO enforcement actions, or vice versa, and 
whether GSK marks the establishment of a cross-border anti-corruption cooperation, which may 
render it possible to exchange bribery evidence between the enforcement agencies. It is worth 
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looking into an intriguing question as to whether the multiple enforcement agencies will at 
some point develop coordinated enforcement program and share information about their 
respective investigations.274 
8.2 Risk-Based Due Diligence on Overseas Third Parties and Subsidiaries  
8.2.1 Keep Abreast of China’s National Prioritised Objective in a Political & Judicial Context  
Operating in China generally entails the use of local partners and agents, whose dealings with 
the government officials are typically not in the foreign investor’s hand but lie within the 
Chinese partners.275In the increasingly complicated environment, the majority of prosecutions 
and enforcement actions involve corrupt payment made indirectly through intermediaries.276 
Due diligence efforts should be conducted on a regular basis, which may help detect and deter 
the third parties’ misconduct.277 GSK illustrates the importance of recognising red flags 
associated with third-party intermediaries and embracing more sophisticated compliance 
mechanisms.278  
The allegations against GSK came at a time when regulators were reviewing the prices and 
production costs of major Chinese and global drug companies in what appeared to have been 
an effort to lower drug prices.279 Such a kind of approach is normally politically-driven, at least, 
implicitely. This holds particularly true in China’s health-care sector that is mired in systemic 
and pervasive corruption,280 which is deemed as a major impediment to government health-care 
reform initiatives. The Chinese healthcare reform is accompanied by a shifting regulatory 
regime as new laws and decrees take effect against bribery.281 The growing drug costs appear to 
have provided the Chinese government with the motivation to widen the probe into the 
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activities of multinational pharmaceutical giants.282 The case of GSK indicates that the drug 
giant lacks proper sensitivity in China’s current political and judicial context and ignores the 
policy and economic repercussions of anti-bribery regulations.283 Apparently, China is  currently 
prioritising the issue of addressing the problems relating to the disproportionally high prices of 
pharmaceutical products as well as infant milk with world-known brands. Unfortunately, GSK 
has failed to respond properly to this national campaign targeting relevant foreign MNCs. The 
accusation against GSK reflects, again, the long-standing issues of serious deficiencies of 
multinationals’ strategies of localisation.284  
8.2.2 Cultivate A Culture of Compliance  
An MNC is expected to comply with applicable laws and regulations of each jurisdiction where 
it operates and promote a culture of high ethical standards in addition to legal compliance.285 It 
is essential for MNCs to take active steps to maintain a strong compliance culture, which will 
maximise the chances of addressing problems internally and solving them before they become 
serious.286 It must be ensured that a company has the proper “tone at the top,” including a 
compliance and ethics program that is tailored to the company’s risks, applied in good faith, 
and effective.287 A proper “tone at the top” should include unambiguous communication from 
senior management about the compliance requirements that is “scrupulously followed” and 
disseminated throughout the organisation.288 The Guide specifically obligates senior 
management to set a strong, ethical culture, "inspire" their colleagues to adhere to that culture, 
and articulate the procedures and standards that underpins that culture.289 Such a culture 
should encourage "ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law" and help 
"prevent, detect, remediate, and report misconduct."290 However, the as discovered relating to 
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the bribery prosecution of the Minstry of Public Security concern may be raised that a culture 
of compliance may not be as strongly embedded in GSK, or, at least, such a culture is not 
perceived as strongly embedded.291 
8.2.3 Corrupt Payment by Intermediaries of Subsidiaries: Parental-Subsidiary Liabilities  
With regard to parent-subsidiary liability, a subsidiary’s actions are imputed to the parent if an 
agency relationship exists.292 A long-standing issue always turns on whether the officers and 
agents of the parent had control over the actions of the subsidiary.293 There is an increased 
trend that parent companies will be held responsible for the actions of local employees and 
partners.294 Foreign subsidiaries are a frequent source of concern for companies subject to the 
FCPA, although it remains to be clarified about the issues of liability for minority-owned 
entities in which a parent may have a substantial stake, but no ostensible control.295 An 
increasingly common issue concerns the appropriate degree of oversight that a parent issuer is 
required to exercise over a minority-owned subsidiary.296 Enforcement agencies may consider 
the formal relationship between the two entities as well as the "practical realities of how the 
parent and subsidiary actually interact.”297 Despite the seminal doctrine of the separate legal 
entity and piercing the corporate veil,298 parent companies are likely to be held responsible for 
the actions of local employees, which underscores the importance of due diligence on 
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prospective third parties.299 In China’s more increasingly complicated business environment, 
foreign MNCs must strengthen their efforts in due diligence and transparency to ensure that 
ethics at the corporate level are translated to ground floor business practices.300  
8.2.4 Localise GSK’s Global Compliance Programmes  
Global compliance measures superimposed on China’s unique business environment are not 
enough.301 Foreign MNCs should truly localise their global compliance programmes to 
specifically address their local operations in China. Thus, having a robust home compliance 
programme makes limited sense, unless it is effectively compatible in China’s social and legal 
settings.302 GSK should always be aware of the degree of risk attributed to particular locations, 
like China, where an agent may present bigger risks for GSK than the same type of agent in 
another country.303 A truly effective compliance program for China needs to be one that 
identifies and addresses the issues arising out of local business and legal culture.304 Such efforts 
are helpful in minimising risk and potential consequences, including reputational damage. 
MNCs operating in China should understand the potential consequences of alleged violations 
of the Chinese anti-bribery laws, regularly assess their risk profile, and highlight hallmarks of 
adequate compliance programmes to account for local variations in enforcement 
standards.305An effective compliance programme “constantly evolves” to reflect the changes to 
the company’s business over time, including changes to the environment in which the company 
operates, the nature of its customers and the laws that govern the company’s actions.306  
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Most significantly, GSK should consider undertaking more due diligence to ensure that existing 
compliance programs are properly implemented in China.307 It is paramount to have a robust 
compliance program covering all critical functions, including sales and marketing personnel as 
well as legal compliance.308 Sales in the UK through legal and compliant channels may warrant 
less scrutiny from a compliance program than GSK’s deals in China, by way of engaging those 
high-risk Chinese third party sales agents.309 The risk-based compliance approach is only 
effective if the company in question is realistic about the locale in which it is dealing.310 GSK 
should have devoted more resources, like increasing its budgets, to ensuring compliance with 
the anti-bribery laws and regularly assess risks and to review and update their policies to reflect 
evolving best practices.311 
8.2.5 Overseas Third Parties: Identify “Red Flags” 
“Red Flags” are simply warning signs that a violation may have occurred or may be about to 
occur.312 Since third parties are commonly used to conceal the payment of bribes to foreign 
officials,313 the requisite level of scrutiny of a prospective third party depends on the “red flags” 
identified through the due diligence process.314 Both the FCPA and Bribery Act 2010 impose 
liabilities on companies for payments made by any third parties acting on its behalf, even if the 
company was not aware of the third party’s conduct.315 It is indispensable to have periodical, 
thorough due diligence reviews of third-party business partners, including but not limited to: 
agents, distributors, consultants and travel agents. Mere negligence is insufficient to impose 
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liability under the statute's third-party payment provision.316 However, proof of conscious 
avoidance, wilful blindness, and deliberate ignorance are sufficient to satisfy the third-party 
payment provision's knowledge requirement.317 There should be policies and procedures 
relating to the risks associated with third parties, including the capacity for on-going monitoring 
and the ability to address any “red flags” that may surface during the course of the third party 
relationship.318  
Individual companies have different compliance needs and there is no “one-size-fits-all” formula 
to an effective model, but a "common-sense and pragmatic approach to evaluating compliance 
programs."319 This leaves it to the company to determine what reasonable internal controls are. 
An effective compliance program is one that is appropriately tailored to meet the needs of the 
company. The adequacy of a company's compliance "staffing and resources" depends on the 
"size, structure, and risk profile of the business."320 GSK’s compliance programme must be 
tailored to the size and nature of the business and the particular risks associated with its global 
location. GSK should have evaluated what type of compliance programme would fit it best.   
Due to the failure to conduct due diligence on the agent responsible for the bribes, GSK must 
identify high-risk activities while concentrating compliance efforts on mitigating potential 
violations of law.321 Emphasising a risk-based approach, GSK may need to tailor its programme 
to take into account its size, product and sensitivity with a particular regard to high-risk areas 
with “red flags”.322 When the “red flags” were raised, GSK had an affirmative duty to investigate 
the suspicious circumstances and took steps to determine whether the anti-bribery laws have 
been violated. If red flags cannot be justified, GSK may run the risk of having had knowledge 
that would make the bribery a violation of anti-bribery laws.323 A mere declaration of its 
innocence would not insulate it from liability. In the wake of the US and Chinese 
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governments’ increasingly rigorous stance on enforcement, foreign multinationals should act 
with more caution in dealing with their foreign agents and business partners.324  
9  Conclusion 
The recent enforcement of Chinese anti-bribery laws against GSK highlights the compliance 
challenges faced by foreign companies operating in China and the importance of the 
maintenance of high legal and ethical standards. Critical to a compliance programme is making 
integrity and ethics a part of the overall evaluation process, which provides incentives for 
compliance. GSK represents China’s highest profile bribery investigation of a foreign company 
since the new bribery rules came into effect in 2013, reflecting broad concerns about the 
challenges of doing business in China. As a milestone for Chinese agencies to impose far more 
rigorous enforcement of analogous anti-bribery laws, it is advisable that MNCs should not 
underestimate the implications of China’s willingness to subject foreign companies to bribery 
prosecutions. 
GSK sends a strong message of deterrence to domestic and foreign actors, and improves China’s 
overall anti-corruption standing in the world. GSK has a particular far-reaching impact on the 
pharmaceutical firms, which are expected to re-examine their internal controls and be more 
legally compliant. It is also imperative that foreign MNCs implement robust anti-bribery 
compliance programmes which are well-designed and tailored to the companies’ specific high-
risk areas. More meaningfully, the first parallel GSK case may set a precedent for the future 
interplay of multinational anti-bribery law. Given that the Bribery Act 2010 and China’s laws 
are relatively untested, the landmark case serves an instrumental role in demonstrating how the 
transnational criminal codes apply to real world issues. In the increasingly complicated 
environment of multinationals and their foreign subsidiaries, MNCs must strengthen efforts in 
due diligence to ensure that ethics at the global corporate level are translated to ground floor 
business practices. 
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